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	 demand:	Results	of	a	DCE	analysis	in	Cambodia	
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Abstract	
Natural	 disasters	 are	 increasing	 in	 frequency	 and	 intensity	 and	 have	 devastating	 impacts	 on	
individuals,	 both	 humanitarian	 and	 economic,	 particularly	 in	 developing	 countries.	
Microinsurance	is	seen	as	one	promising	instrument	of	disaster	risk	management,	however	the	
level	 of	demand	 for	 respective	projects	 remains	 low.	Using	behavioural	games	and	a	discrete	
choice	experiment,	this	paper	analyses	the	demand	for	hypothetical	microinsurance	products	in	
rural	Cambodia	and	contributes	significant	household	level	evidence	to	the	current	research.	A	
general	preference	for	microinsurance	can	be	found,	with	demand	significantly	affected	by	price,	
provider,	 requirements	 for	 prevention	 and	 combinations	 with	 credit.	 Furthermore,	 financial	
literacy,	 risk	 aversion,	 levels	 of	 trust	 and	 previous	 disaster	 experience	 impact	 the	 individual	
demand	for	flood	insurance	in	rural	Cambodia.	
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This	paper	presents	the	empirical	results	of	a	discrete	choice	experiment	in	rural	Cambodia	and	is	part	of	the	PhD	
research	project,	“Experiencing	natural	disasters:	how	this	influences	risk,	trust	and	the	demand	for	microinsurance”,	
by	Oliver	Fiala.	
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1 Introduction	
A	growing	number	of	natural	disasters	as	well	as	increasing	economic	and	humanitarian	impacts	
are	evident.	This	is	driven	by	a	higher	vulnerability	towards	the	effects	of	hazards	as	well	as	the	
rising	frequency	and	intensity	of	disasters	due	to	climate	change.	Developing	countries,	especially	
poor	communities,	are	particularly	exposed	to	climate	risks	because	of	their	location	in	high-risk	
areas,	 their	 economic	 dependence	 on	 agriculture	 and	 higher	 rates	 of	 population	 growth.	
Furthermore,	 the	 damage	 caused	 by	 disasters	 affects	 development	 processes	 and	 hinders	
poverty	reduction	efforts.	(IPCC	2012;	Ahsan	2014;	Surminski	&	Oramas-Dorta	2011)	
The	reduction	of	risk	exposure	and	vulnerability	as	well	as	the	creation	of	response	institutions	
are	 some	 forms	of	 disaster	prevention,	 and	more	broadly,	 of	 disaster	 risk	management.	Risk	
financing	 strategies,	 and	 insurance	 solutions	 in	particular,	have	gained	much	attention	 in	 the	
academic	literature.	Microinsurance	provides	easily	accessible	and	affordable	insurance	for	life,	
property,	crops	and	health	against	the	risks	of	natural	disasters.	In	addition	to	the	reduction	of	
risks	for	low-income	households,	insured	individuals	and	small	businesses	are	more	creditworthy	
and	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 invest	 in	 productive	 assets.	 Additionally,	 investment	 in	 prevention	
measures	can	be	encouraged	through	a	carefully	designed	and	implemented	insurance	scheme.	
Although	microinsurance	is	seen	as	a	promising	instrument	by	both	academics	and	practitioners,	
in	many	microinsurance	pilots,	demand	was	consistently	low	and	insurances	often	failed	to	scale	
up	to	a	sustainable	size.	(Linnerooth-Bayer	et	al.	2011;	Clarke	&	Grenham	2013;	Mechler	et	al.	
2006;	Surminski	&	Oramas-Dorta	2014;	Biener	&	Eling	2012;	Eling	et	al.	2014;	De	Bock	&	Gelade	
2012)	
This	 paper	 investigates	 the	 impact	 of	 several	 determinants	 –	 including	 individual	 risk-taking	
propensity,	levels	of	trust,	exposure	to	risk	–	on	the	demand	for	microinsurance.	A	discrete	choice	
experiment	accompanied	by	a	survey	and	behavioural	games	were	conducted	in	rural	Cambodia.		
The	 paper	 is	 structured	 as	 follows:	 Chapter	 2	 presents	 a	 brief	 introduction	 to	 the	 issue	 of	
microinsurance	demand.	Chapters	3	and	4	present	the	method	and	data	used	in	the	research.	
Chapter	5	will	show	and	explain	the	results,	with	a	conclusion	in	chapter	6.	
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2 The	demand	for	microinsurance	products	against	disaster	risk	
Various	economic	and	social	factors	are	found	in	the	academic	literature	to	explain	the	individual	
demand	for	microinsurance	products.	Following	the	framework	by	Outreville	(2013)	and	Eling	et	
al.	 (2014),	 12	 determinants	 –	 economic,	 social,	 structural	 and	 personal	 factors	 –	 can	 be	
distinguished.	 These	 include,	 among	 others,	 the	 price	 of	 the	 product,	 wealth	 and	 income,	
individual	 levels	 of	 risk	 aversion	 and	 trust,	 the	 existence	 of	 other	 risk	 sharing	 networks	 and	
exposure	to	risk.	(Outreville	2013;	Eling	et	al.	2014;	Cole	et	al.	2013;	Giné	&	Yang	2009;	Giné	et	
al.	2008;	Cole	et	al.	2007;	Mahul	&	Skees	2007)	
Economic	 factors	 include	 the	 price	 of	 the	 insurance	 product	 as	 well	 as	 individual	 wealth	 or	
income.	As	 expected,	 empirical	 evidence	 shows	 a	 negative	 effect	 of	 price	 on	microinsurance	
demand.	Several	studies	show	a	higher	probability	of	 insurance	uptake	when	the	price	of	the	
product	 decreased	 or	 vouchers	 or	 subsides	 were	 disbursed	 (Cole	 et	 al.	 2013;	 Mobarak	 &	
Rosenzweig	2012;	Karlan	et	al.	2014;	Brouwer	&	Akter	2010;	Arshad	et	al.	2015;	Giné	et	al.	2008;	
Viverita	et	al.	2010).	When	investigating	the	role	of	wealth	and	income,	empirical	studies	suggest	
that	wealthier	households	are	more	likely	to	buy	insurance	(Giné	et	al.	2008;	Cole	et	al.	2013;	
Gaurav	et	al.	2011;	Giné	&	Yang	2009;	Arshad	et	al.	2015;	Akotey	et	al.	2011;	Akter	et	al.	2008).		
Social	 and	 cultural	 factors	 include	 risk	 aversion,	 non-performance	 risk	 of	 the	 insurance,	 the	
individual	 levels	 of	 trust,	 religion	 and	 education/financial	 literacy.	 Risk	 aversion	 and	 trust	 in	
particular	are	found	to	play	a	significant	role	in	explaining	microinsurance	demand.	In	contrast	
to	traditional	insurance	markets,	individuals	with	a	higher	level	of	risk	aversion	are	found	to	be	
less	likely	to	buy	microinsurance	products	(Giné	et	al.	2008;	Giné	&	Yang	2009;	Giesbert	et	al.	
2011;	Dercon	et	al.	2011;	Cole	et	al.	2013).	One	explanation	 for	 this	observation	may	be	 the	
existence	 of	 non-performance	 risk	 –	 uncertainty	which	 can	 arise	 from	 insurer	 bankruptcy	 or	
contract	exclusions	–	and	therefore	the	perception	of	insurance	as	a	risky	product	itself	(Eling	et	
al.	2014).	Therefore	trust	 in	the	insurance	company	and	product	are	necessary,	particularly	 in	
countries	with	weak	institutions	for	contract	enforcements	(Cole	et	al.	2013;	Eling	et	al.	2014).	
Empirical	 evidence	 shows	 a	 positive	 relationship	 between	 trust	 and	microinsurance	 demand	
(Giné	et	al.	2008;	Cai	et	al.	2009;	Dercon	et	al.	2011;	Cole	et	al.	2013;	De	Bock	&	Gelade	2012;	
Eling	et	al.	2014;	Liu	et	al.	2013).	Furthermore,	there	is	some	evidence	that	religion	or	fatalism	is	
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associated	with	higher	demand	(Gheyssens	&	Günther	2011;	Cole	et	al.	2013).	Finally,	financial	
literacy	 is	 found	 to	 have	 a	 positive	 impact	 on	 microinsurance	 demand,	 providing	 a	 better	
understanding	of	insurance	as	a	risk	management	instrument,	as	well	as	of	the	specific	product	
and	its	terms	(Giné	et	al.	2008;	Cole	et	al.	2013;	Akotey	et	al.	2011;	Heenkenda	2014;	Brata	et	al.	
2014;	Patt	et	al.	2009;	Cai	et	al.	2011;	Gaurav	et	al.	2011;	Dercon	et	al.	2014).		
Structural	factors	encompass	the	existence	of	alternative	and	informal	risk-sharing	networks,	the	
quality	 of	 the	 product	 and	 the	 risk	 exposure	 of	 the	 individual.	 Empirical	 research	 shows	
ambiguous	effects	of	informal	risk-sharing	networks	on	insurance	demand	due	to	their	nature	of	
either	 substitutes	or	 complements	 for	 insurance	products	 (De	Bock	&	Gelade	2012;	Clarke	&	
Dercon	2009).	The	role	of	quality	is	considered	only	for	health	insurance,	where	a	positive	link	
between	 service	 quality	 and	 insurance	demand	 is	 evident	 (Eling	 et	 al.	 2014).	 Finally,	 the	 risk	
exposure	of	the	individual	has	a	significant	impact	on	the	demand	for	microinsurance,	although	
the	direction	of	this	effect	is	not	clear.	Previous	experience	of	disasters	can	update	an	individual’s	
information	and	perceptions	and	encourage	households	to	develop	adaptation	strategies	(Turner	
et	al.	2014;	Liu	et	al.	2015;	Eling	et	al.	2014;	Karlan	et	al.	2014;	Galarza	&	Carter	2011).	However,	
the	experience	of	external	assistance	following	a	disaster	from	various	sources	(governments,	
charities	 etc.)	 may	 negatively	 impact	 the	 demand	 for	 insurance	 products	 (‘charity	 hazard’)	
(Raschky	et	al.	2012;	Kousky	et	al.	2013;	Albarran	&	Attanasio	2005).	
Personal	 factors	 such	 as	 age	 and	 gender	 have	 mostly	 been	 included	 as	 control	 variables	 in	
empirical	studies.	Previous	research	finds	highly	ambiguous	results	for	both	factors	(Giesbert	et	
al.	2011;	Gaurav	et	al.	2011;	Turner	et	al.	2014;	Giné	et	al.	2008;	Heenkenda	2014;	Arshad	et	al.	
2015;	Guo	2015).		
Table	1	presents	an	overview	of	the	various	determinants	and	their	effect	on	demand,	following	
the	survey	structure	by	Eling	et	al.	(2014).	The	following	empirical	analysis	investigates	the	effects	
of	 the	 various	 determinants	 presented	 above	 on	 the	 demand	 for	 disaster	 insurance	 in	 rural	
Cambodia.	
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Table	1:	Determinants	of	microinsurance	demand	and	evidence	of	literature	
Category	 Variable	 Effect	on	demand*	
Economic	factors	 Price	 –	
Wealth/Income	 +	
Social	and	cultural	factors	 Risk	aversion	 –/(+)	
Non-performance	and	basis	risk	 –	
Trust	and	peer	effects	 +/(–)	
Religion/fatalism	 +	
Financial	literacy	and	education	 +	
Structural	factors	 Informal	risk	sharing	 +/–	
Quality	of	service	 +	
Risk	exposure	 +/–	
Personal	 and	demographic	
factors	
Age	 +/(–)	
Gender	 +/–	
Determinants	for	microinsurance	demand	follow	the	structure	of	Eling	et	al.	(2014)	and	Outreville	(2013).	
*Empirical	evidence	for	sign	of	determination	following	the	survey	by	Eling	et	al.	(2014).	Effects	in	parentheses	are	
found	by	one	reference	only.	
	
	 	 6	
3 Method	
In	order	to	elicit	individual	preferences,	discrete	choice	experiments	(DCE)	provide	an	instrument	
to	reveal	an	individual’s	valuation	of	product	attributes,	stating	their	choice	over	hypothetical	
product	 alternatives.	Discrete	 choice	 experiments	 emerged	 as	 an	 attractive	 tool	 in	 situations	
where	the	importance	of	specific	characteristics	of	a	good	or	service	cannot	be	observed	based	
on	 actual	 choices.	 Therefore,	 the	 strength	 of	 an	 individual’s	 preferences	 as	 well	 as	 their	
probability	 for	 purchasing	 the	 product	 can	 be	 investigated.	 This	 is	 of	 particular	 interest	 for	
analysing	hypothetical	demand	for	products	which	are	not	yet	available.	(Mangham	et	al.	2009;	
Navrud	&	Magnussen	2013;	WHO	2012;	Reynaud	&	Nguyen	2012)	
While	discrete	choice	experiments	in	developing	countries	have	becoming	particularly	popular	
for	economic	valuations	in	health	economic	research,	only	a	small	number	of	studies	have	been	
conducted	 on	 insurance	 demand	 against	 disaster	 risk.	 This	 method	 can	 provide	 important	
insights	 into	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 individual’s	 willingness	 to	 pay	 and	 the	 various	
attributes	 of	 the	 hypothetical	 insurance	 scheme.	 (Guo	 2015;	 Navrud	 &	 Magnussen	 2013;	
Brouwer	et	al.	2013;	Reynaud	&	Nguyen	2012;	Brouwer	&	Akter	2010;	Mangham	et	al.	2009)	
Theoretical	framework	of	DCE	
A	discrete	choice	experiment	asks	the	respondents	to	state	their	choice	over	sets	of	hypothetical	
alternatives,	 each	 of	 which	 is	 described	 by	 multiple	 attributes/characteristics.	 A	 regression	
analysis	then	estimates	the	individual	value	of	every	attribute	as	well	as	the	willingness	to	trade	
one	attribute	for	another,	and	therefore	identifies	the	determinants	of	the	product.	With	a	basis	
on	random	utility	theory	and	utility	maximisation,	the	method	relies	on	the	individual	choosing	
the	alternative	which	provides	the	highest	value	given	their	own	assessment	of	risk	preferences.	
However,	discrete	choice	experiments	assume	stable	and	coherent	preferences	of	 individuals,	
who	must	therefore	be	capable	of	selecting	a	preferred	insurance	product	on	the	basis	of	the	
presented	 attributes.	 Although	 a	 choice	 experiment	 presents	 a	 real-world	 decision-making	
situation	(in	comparison	to	the	ranking	of	alternatives),	it	focuses	on	given	responses	rather	than	
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on	the	observation	of	actual	behaviour.	(Mangham	et	al.	2009;	Nghiem	&	Duong	2012;	Brouwer	
et	al.	2013;	WHO	2012)	
The	underlying	random	utility	model	contains	a	deterministic	and	a	stochastic	part.	While	the	
former	is	a	function	of	the	product	attributes	and	individual	characteristics,	the	latter	is	an	error	
term	capturing	non-observed	factors	which	impact	the	individual’s	utility.	The	resulting	model	is	
a	linear	function	of	all	attributes	and	the	‘opt-out’	option.	The	‘opt-out’	or	‘status	quo’	option	
represents	 the	 choice	 of	 the	 baseline	 alternatives,	 in	 this	 case	 no	purchase	of	 any	 insurance	
product,	and	are	usually	not	specified.	Furthermore,	 individual	characteristics	are	 included	as	
interaction	 terms.	The	 regression	models	usually	 consist	of	a	dichotomous	or	polychotomous	
categorically	 dependent	 variable.	 Conditional	 logit,	 mixed	 logit/random	 parameter	 logit	 and	
multinomial	 logit	 models	 are	 used	 in	 the	 literature	 to	 estimate	 the	 indirect	 utility	 function	
(Reynaud	&	Nguyen	2012;	Brouwer	et	al.	2013;	Mangham	et	al.	2009)	
Empirical	evidence	
There	is	a	limited	scope	of	academic	research	investigating	determinants	and	willingness	to	pay	
for	 flood	 insurance	 in	developing	 countries	by	using	discrete	 choice	experiments.	Brouwer	&	
Akter	 (2010)	 analysed	 the	 demand	 for	 microinsurance	 of	 flood-affected	 households	 in	 rural	
Bangladesh.	A	range	of	insurance	schemes	were	offered	(including	property,	crops,	health	and	
unemployment),	 with	 various	 cover	 sums,	 premiums	 and	 providers.	 The	 affordability	 of	 the	
product	played	a	crucial	role,	however	risk	exposure	(previous	experience	of	floods)	did	not	affect	
the	demand.	Nghiem	&	Duong	(2012)	investigated	microinsurance	demand	in	Vietnam,	finding	a	
willingness	to	pay	a	higher	premium	in	order	to	receive	higher	pay-out	levels.	Investigating	the	
determinants	for	flood	 insurance	 in	Vietnam,	Reynaud	&	Nguyen	(2012)	conducted	a	discrete	
choice	experiment	including	different	insurance	types,	providers,	cover	sums	and	premiums.	A	
strong	 preference	 for	 the	 status	 quo	 (no	 insurance)	 was	 found.	 Health	 insurance	 was	 the	
preferred	insurance	product,	provided	by	a	state-owned	company.	Finally,	Brouwer	et	al.	(2013)	
investigated	willingness	 to	pay	 for	 flood	 insurance	 in	Vietnam,	 finding	 a	 substantial	 demand.	
Higher	 insurance	 cover	 with	 the	 government	 as	 product	 provider	 was	 preferred	 by	 the	
respondents.	
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4 Data	
Design	of	choice	sets	
Prior	to	conducting	a	choice	experiment	in	rural	Cambodia,	various	attributes	and	their	levels	had	
to	 be	 established,	 after	 which	 hypothetical	 alternatives	 were	 combined	 into	 choice	 sets.	 To	
ensure	 that	 respondents	 are	 able	 to	 consider	 all	 attributes	 for	 their	 choice,	 less	 than	 ten	
attributes	 are	 usually	 used	 in	 order	 to	 reduce	 cognitive	 difficulties.	 The	 resulting	 choice	 sets	
consist	of	 two	or	more	alternatives	as	well	as	an	 ‘opt-out’	option,	 if	applicable.	Both	a	 full	or	
fractional	factorial	design	can	be	used.	Whilst	the	former	consists	of	all	possible	combinations	
between	the	various	attribute	levels,	the	latter	can	be	used	for	larger	choice	sets	as	long	as	the	
design	 is	 orthogonal	 (no	 correlation	 between	 estimated	 parameters)	 and	 balanced	 (equal	
numbers	of	each	attribute	level).	(Mangham	et	al.	2009;	Huber	&	Zwerina	1996)	
In	 the	 next	 step,	 several	 relevant	 attributes	 were	 selected,	 following	 previous	 research	 in	
developing	 countries,	 including	 cover	 sum,	premium	and	provider	 (Reynaud	&	Nguyen	2012;	
Brouwer	et	al.	2013;	Brouwer	&	Akter	2010;	Arshad	et	al.	2015).	However,	no	crop	 insurance	
existed	at	 the	time	of	 the	experiment	 in	Cambodia.	Therefore,	assumptions	 for	premium	and	
cover	sums	had	to	be	made	based	on	available	data	from	demand	studies	in	other	developing	
countries	as	well	as	economic	performance	indicators	in	Cambodia	(Brouwer	&	Akter	2010;	Akter	
2012;	 Cai	 et	 al.	 2013;	World	 Bank	 2014;	 Cambodia	 National	 Institute	 of	 Statistics	 2014).	 No	
accurate	 information	 regarding	 flood	 risk	 in	 the	 specific	 study	 area	 of	 rural	 Cambodia	 was	
available.	Premiums	were	set	based	on	their	affordability	and	their	relation	to	the	offered	pay-
outs	and	were	between	1%	and	5%	of	the	household	income,	following	the	previous	studies	of	
Brouwer	&	Akter	(2010)	and	Akter	(2012).	The	third	attribute,	‘provider’,	consisted	of	five	levels,	
including	national	and	provincial	government,	private	company,	non-governmental	organisation	
and	the	community	itself	(the	village	as	provider).	Furthermore,	the	preferences	for	indemnity-	
or	 index-based	 insurance	schemes	as	well	as	for	a	combination	with	a	 loan	were	 investigated	
(Mechler	 et	 al.	 2006;	 Clarke	&	Grenham	2013).	 Finally,	 the	 requirement	 of	 client	 prevention	
efforts	in	order	to	receive	insurance	were	added,	to	assess	the	relationship	between	insurance	
and	prevention	(Surminski	&	Oramas-Dorta	2014;	Linnerooth-Bayer	&	Hochrainer-Stigler	2015;	
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Mechler	et	al.	2006).	However,	no	specific	costs	or	conditions	for	both	prevention	efforts	or	credit	
were	given.	Table	2	shows	the	different	attributes	and	levels	of	the	choice	sets.		
Table	2:	Attributes	and	levels	
Attribute	 Level	
Cover	for	loss	 200,000	Riel	
500,000	Riel	
1,000,000	Riel	
Premium	(per	week)	 800	Riel	
2,000	Riel	
4,000	Riel	
Condition	for	pay-out	 Pay-out	after	a	visit	of	insurance	employee	(indemnity-based)	
Pay-out	if	measuring	station	has	indicated	a	flood	(index-based)	
Credit	 Combination	of	insurance	with	loan	
No	combination	of	insurance	and	loan	
Prevention	 No	prevention	effort	
Insurance	requires	additional	prevention	effort	
Provider	 National	government	
Provincial	government	
Private	company	
NGO	
Village	
	
Every	choice	set	was	accompanied	by	an	‘opt-out’	option,	offering	the	individual	the	choice	of	
the	baseline	alternative	(no	insurance).	The	six	attributes	presented	above	result	in	360	possible	
insurance	 combinations.	 The	 rotation	design	algorithm	by	Aizaki	 (2012)	was	used	 in	order	 to	
create	a	fractional	factorial	design.	48	unique	alternatives	could	be	constructed	representing	all	
characteristics	of	the	proposed	insurances,	using	the	catalogue-based	approach	by	Johnson	et	al.	
(2007)	and	Chrzan	&	Orme	(2000).	
In	the	following	step,	24	choice	sets	were	designed,	each	providing	three	alternatives	(insurance	
A,	insurance	B,	no	insurance),	whereby	the	attributes	were	distributed	independently	and	equally	
over	the	various	choice	sets.	In	order	to	consider	the	cognitive	capacity	of	the	participants,	all	
choice	sets	have	been	grouped	in	four	versions	(Reynaud	&	Nguyen	2012).	Each	participant	of	
the	interview	was	presented	with	one	group	of	six	choice	sets.	The	appendix	presents	a	sample	
of	the	choice	set.	
The	choice	of	a	particular	alternative	within	the	choice	set	follows	utility	maximisation.	Thereby,	
the	 utility	 of	 one	 alternative	 (𝑗) 	given	 a	 certain	 choice	 set	 (𝑘) 	is	 assumed	 to	 comprise	 a	
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deterministic	 part	𝑉(𝑋'(|𝛽) 	and	 a	 random	 part	 𝜖,'( .	 With	 𝜖 	from	 a	 type	 I	 extreme	 value	
distribution,	the	individual	utility	for	an	alternative	(𝑗)	𝑈,'(	is	given	by:	
𝑈,'( = 𝑉 𝑋,'( 𝛽 +	𝜖,'(	
In	order	to	assess	average	individual	preferences,	a	condition	logit	model	is	used,	starting	with	a	
basic	model	of	each	alternative,	 consisting	of	an	additive	 function	of	 the	 six	attributes	and	a	
dummy	variable	representing	the	utility	of	the	‘opt-out’	option.	
𝑉' = 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚' + 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟' + 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟' + 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒' + 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, + 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡' + 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑜𝑢𝑡	
Weekly	premium	and	cover	sum	are	noted	in	Cambodia	Riel.	The	attribute	‘provider’	is	a	dummy	
variable,	which	equals	to	one	for	non-governmental	organisation,	private	company,	provincial	
government	and	village	(with	national	government	as	baseline).	The	attribute	‘type’	is	equal	to	
one	 for	 an	 index-based	 insurance	 scheme	 and	 ‘prevention’	 is	 equal	 to	 one	 if	 the	 insurance	
requires	prevention	efforts	of	the	individual.	Finally,	if	the	dummy	variable	‘credit’	is	equal	to	one,	
it	represents	a	loan	and	insurance	bundle.		
The	model	assumes	that	differences	in	utility	only	arise	from	differences	in	 insurances,	rather	
than	 in	 individual	 characteristics.	 Therefore,	 in	 order	 to	 investigate	 the	 effects	 of	 individual	
attributes	(risk	aversion,	level	of	trust,	experience	with	disasters,	income,	financial	literacy	etc.),	
and	to	elicit	individual	preferences,	interaction	terms	between	attributes	of	the	conditional	logit	
model	(including	the	‘opt-out’	option)	and	personal	characteristics	are	measured.	
Scope	of	research	
The	data	was	collected	through	surveys	and	experiments	in	six	villages	in	rural	areas	of	Cambodia.	
Villages	 in	 the	 Thma	 Koul	 district	 in	 Battambang	 province	 were	 selected,	 comprised	 of	
households	both	affected	and	unaffected	by	severe	flooding	in	October	2013.	The	research	was	
conducted	 in	 September	 2014	with	 the	 support	 of	 the	University	 of	 Battambang	 (UBB).	 Two	
experimental	games	investigating	the	levels	of	risk	attitudes	and	levels	of	trust	were	conducted,	
followed	by	a	questionnaire	which	finished	with	the	discrete	choice	experiment.		
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The	behavioural	experiments	followed	the	instance	by	Schechter	(2007),	which	investigated	risk	
attitudes	and	levels	of	trust	in	Peru	and	provided	advice	for	handling	typical	problems	associated	
with	such	experimental	games	in	developing	countries,	including	lack	of	literacy	and	numeracy	
skills	in	rural	areas.	A	similar	design	is	used	by	Ahsan	(2014)	in	Bangladesh.	Due	to	the	significant	
value	of	money	(at	the	local	level)	used	in	the	games,	participants’	actions	more	closely	reflect	
real-life	risk	decisions	(Schechter	2007).	In	the	risk	game,	each	participant	was	endowed	with	a	
certain	amount	of	money,	of	which	he	or	she	could	bet	a	share.	Thereafter,	the	participants	rolled	
a	dice,	which	determined	a	negative,	neutral	or	positive	outcome.	The	share	bet	in	the	risk	game	
is	defined	as	risk-taking	propensity.	The	trust	game	follows	the	so-called	 investment	game	by	
Berg	et	al.	(1995).	A	participant	is	endowed	with	the	same	amount	of	money	as	in	the	risk	game,	
which	he	or	she	can	send	to	an	anonymous	second	player.	Any	amount	sent	is	tripled.	In	the	next	
round,	the	second	player	can	return	money	to	the	first	player,	if	he	or	she	wishes.	Money	sent	
by	the	first	player	is	an	indicator	of	the	participant’s	level	of	trust,	while	money	returned	by	the	
second	player	is	defined	as	trustworthiness	(Schechter	2007;	Berg	et	al.	1995).	
The	survey	that	followed	the	games	included	questions	on	household	characteristics,	previous	
experiences	of	natural	disaster	and	questions	regarding	disaster	risk	management	activities	as	
well	 as	 prevention	 and	 preparedness	 toward	 floods.	 The	 questionnaire	 was	 developed	 with	
orientation	on	similar	surveys	in	the	relevant	literature	(Ahsan	et	al.	2014;	Reynaud	&	Nguyen	
2012;	 Schechter	 2007)	 and	 discussed	 with	 researchers	 from	 the	 University	 of	 Battambang.	
Following	the	survey,	the	above	presented	discrete	choice	experiment	was	conducted.	
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5 Results	
A	conditional	logit	model	was	estimated	in	order	to	elicit	preferences	for	microinsurance	demand	
against	disaster	risk.	Table	3	presents	the	results	of	the	estimation.	
Table	3:	Results	of	discrete	choice	experiment	(conditional	logit	model)	
	 Model	1	 Model	2	 Model	3	
Premium	 -127.010***	
(42.562)	
-156.786***	
(44.567)	
-194.924***	
(55.600)	
Cover	 0.082	(0.130)	 0.116	(0.134)	 0.184	(0.143)	
Condition	 for	 pay-out	 (Index-based	
insurance)	
0.115	(0.112)	 0.105	(0.118)	 0.237*	(0.134)	
Credit	(Combination	with	loan)	 0.184*	(0.105)	 0.187*	(0.110)	 0.537***	(0.175)	
Prevention	 (Insurance	 requires	 additional	
prevention	effort)	
-0.137	(0.105)	 -0.104	(0.110)	 -1.541***	(0.527)	
Provider	(Provincial	government)	 0.133	(0.146)	 0.193	(0.151)	 0.156	(0.162)	
Provider	(Private	company)	 0.172	(0.150)	 0.212	(0.156)	 0.264	(0.172)	
Provider	(Non-governmental	organisation)	 0.379**	(0.157)	 0.404**	(0.163)	 0.296	(0.182)	
Provider	(Village)	 0.106	(0.141)	 0.144	(0.147)	 0.147	(0.162)	
No	insurance	 -0.373**	(0.185)	 -1.179***	(0.370)	 -1.670**	(0.778)	
No	insurance	:	Affected	 	 0.659***	(0.184)	 2.128***	(0.407)	
No	insurance	:	Share	bet	in	risk	game	 	 -0.928**	(0.384)	 -1.624***	(0.543)	
No	insurance	:	Share	sent	in	trust	game	 	 1.988***	(0.384)	 1.957***	(0.550)	
No	insurance	:	Financial	literacy	 	 -0.466***	(0.069)	 -0.388***	(0.095)	
Premium	 :	 Total	 income	 per	 capita	 in	 US	
Dollars	(2013)	
	 	 0.216*	(0.114)	
Credit	 (Combination	with	 loan)	 :	Household	
without	credit	
	 	 -0.403*	(0.210)	
Prevention	 (Insurance	 requires	 effort)	 :	
Importance	of	prevention	
	 	 0.328***	(0.115)	
No	insurance	:	Ability	for	prevention	 	 	 0.244**	(0.103)	
No	insurance	:	Consequences	of	flood	 	 	 -0.730***	(0.108)	
No	insurance	:	Vulnerability	of	household	 	 	 0.119	(0.175)	
No	 insurance	 :	Received	money/goods	 from	
government	
	 	 0.737**	(0.288)	
No	 insurance	 :	Received	money/goods	 from	
charities	
	 	 0.211	(0.288)	
No	insurance	:	Agricultural	land	owned	in	ha	 	 	 0.159*	(0.086)	
No	insurance	:	Use	of	chemical	fertiliser	 	 	 1.021***	(0.320)	
Number	of	observations	 3,309	 3,219	 2,949	
Akaike	information	criterion	(AIC)	 1,955	 1,775	 1,351	
Adjusted	McFadden	R2	 0.025	 0.090	 0.253	
Standard	errors	in	parenthesis,	***	p	<	0.01,	**	p	<	0.05,	*	p	<	0.10.	
The	price	of	the	 insurance	significantly	and	negatively	 impacts	the	demand	for	the	product,	a	
result	which	 follows	both	empirical	 findings	as	well	 as	 the	 standard	 theory	 (Cole	et	 al.	 2013;	
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Mobarak	&	Rosenzweig	2012;	Karlan	et	al.	2014;	Brouwer	&	Akter	2010;	Arshad	et	al.	2015;	Giné	
et	al.	2008;	Viverita	et	al.	2010).	However,	this	effect	is	found	to	decrease	slightly	with	increasing	
income.	
The	respondents	are	found	to	have	a	preference	for	insurance	products	which	are	bundled	with	
a	credit.	Therefore	a	complementary	relationship	between	the	two	products	can	be	found	(Giné	
et	 al.	 2008;	 Akter	 et	 al.	 2008;	 Arshad	 et	 al.	 2015).	 However,	 the	 bundle	 with	 a	 loan	 was	
particularly	attractive	for	individuals	who	already	had	credit.		
As	expected,	insurance	products	which	require	additional	prevention	efforts	from	the	individual	
are	less	preferred	than	adequate	products	without	any	prevention	requirements.	However,	this	
effect	 is	 smaller	 for	 individuals	who	 evaluate	 prevention	 as	 important.	 However,	 for	 a	more	
detailed	 consideration	 of	 the	 effect	 of	 prevention	 on	 insurance	 demand,	 specific	 prevention	
projects	and	associated	costs	must	be	provided.	
In	 term	 of	 insurance	 providers,	 respondents	 show	 a	 preference	 for	 non-governmental	
organisations	over	the	national	government	(although	this	effect	becomes	insignificant	in	model	
3).	 When	 asked	 after	 the	 discrete	 choice	 experiment,	 respondents	 preferred	 the	
village/immediate	 community	 as	 provider,	 followed	 by	 the	 national	 government	 and	 non-
governmental	organisations.	Finally,	model	3	shows	significance	for	a	preference	towards	index-
based	schemes.	
By	 including	 an	 ‘opt-out’	 option	 in	 every	 choice	 set,	 the	 respondents	 were	 able	 to	 show	 a	
preference	for	the	status	quo	over	any	insurance	scheme.	The	significant	and	negative	coefficient	
for	‘No	insurance’	indicates	that	insurance,	and	therefore	change,	is	preferred	to	the	status	quo.	
However,	this	effect	is	slightly	smaller	for	individuals	who	believe	they	have	greater	prevention	
capabilities	and	insurance	is	therefore	specifically	demanded	by	more	vulnerable	respondents.	
The	demand	for	insurance	is	greater	on	average	from	individuals	with	higher	levels	of	financial	
literacy.	This	result	therefore	supports	the	assumption	found	in	the	academic	literature,	that	low	
financial	 literacy	 and	 therefore	 a	 lesser	 understanding	 of	 insurance	 products	 may	 be	 an	
explanation	for	low	uptake	rates	of	microinsurance	schemes	in	developing	countries	(Giné	et	al.	
2008;	Cole	et	al.	2013;	Akotey	et	al.	2011;	Heenkenda	2014;	Brata	et	al.	2014;	Patt	et	al.	2009;	
Cai	et	al.	2011;	Gaurav	et	al.	2011;	Dercon	et	al.	2014).	
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Risk	 aversion	 is	 found	 to	 have	 a	 negative	 impact	 on	 insurance	 demand,	which	 –	 although	 in	
contrast	to	traditional	insurance	theory	–	follows	empirical	evidence	regarding	microinsurance	
(Giné	et	al.	2008;	Giné	&	Yang	2009;	Giesbert	et	al.	2011;	Dercon	et	al.	2011;	Cole	et	al.	2013).	
The	perception	of	the	insurance	instrument	as	a	risky	element	itself	as	well	as	ambiguity	aversion	
can	 explain	 why	 more	 risk-taking	 individuals	 are	 more	 likely,	 on	 average,	 to	 purchase	
microinsurance.	Despite	the	relatively	high	lump	sum	an	individual	receives	in	case	of	a	disaster,	
no	indicators	are	found	to	suggest	that	the	insurance	is	seen	as	a	pure	gamble	in	order	to	improve	
livelihoods,	for	instance	by	migration	into	urban	areas.	
Trust	 is	found	to	have	a	significant	effect	on	the	overall	 interest	 in	 insurance.	 Individuals	who	
display	a	higher	 level	of	trust	show,	on	average,	a	 lower	demand	for	microinsurance	(positive	
relationship	between	level	of	trust	and	status	quo).	This	result	is	contrary	to	the	outcomes	found	
by	most	other	studies	(Giné	et	al.	2008;	Cai	et	al.	2009;	Dercon	et	al.	2011;	Cole	et	al.	2013;	De	
Bock	&	Gelade	2012;	Eling	et	al.	2014;	Liu	et	al.	2013).	Interpersonal	trust,	as	measured	by	the	
used	investment	game,	is	usually	seen	as	an	indicator	for	a	general	level	of	trust	towards	others	
(De	Bock	&	Gelade	2012).	Due	to	participants’	unfamiliarity	with	insurance	products,	it	is	unlikely	
that	this	result	 indicates	 ‘peer	effects’,	depending	on	previous	negative	experience.	However,	
the	effect	can	be	explained	if	the	measurement	of	trust	used	in	this	paper	concentrates	solely	on	
interpersonal	 trust	 within	 the	 community.	 In	 this	 case,	 trust	 towards	 other	members	 of	 the	
community	may	 reflect	 the	efficiency	of	 informal,	 community-based	 risk-sharing	 instruments,	
which	operate	as	substitutes	to	 insurance	products	(De	Bock	&	Gelade	2012;	Arnott	&	Stiglitz	
1991;	Brata	et	al.	2014).	Despite	the	fact	that	the	presence	of	trust	–	and	more	broadly,	social	
capital	–	does	not	automatically	 imply	 the	existence	of	any	 informal	 insurance,	 the	access	 to	
networks	 and	 social	 capital	 can	 be	 used	 as	 a	 proxy	 for	 informal	 instruments	 (Dercon	 2002;	
Morsink	2012).	 In	 this	context,	empirical	evidence	shows	a	 lower	 interest	 in	health	 insurance	
products	in	more	cohesive	communities	and	a	higher	trust	in	informal	instruments	(Jowett	2003).	
Individuals	with	previous	experience	of	natural	disasters	show	a	higher	preference	for	the	status	
quo	 and	 therefore	 less	 interest	 in	 insurance,	 although	 this	 effect	 is	 smaller	 for	 individuals	
expecting	more	 severe	 consequences	 in	 the	 future.	While	 several	 previous	 studies	 show	 the	
opposite	effect	for	risk	exposure	(Akter	et	al.	2008;	Arun	&	Bendig	2010;	Brata	et	al.	2014;	Turner	
et	al.	2014;	Liu	et	al.	2015),	there	is	also	academic	research	supporting	this	result	(Giesbert	et	al.	
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2011;	Arun	et	al.	2012;	Grislain-Letrémy	2015).	Although	 the	distinction	of	underlying	 factors	
explaining	 risk	 exposure	 is	 empirically	 difficult,	 the	 result	 indicates	 that	 the	 updating	 of	
information	 may	 be	 of	 particular	 importance.	 Previous	 disaster	 experience	 can	 provide	
information	 about	 existing	 coping	 strategies,	 including	 the	 stability	 of	 informal	 risk-sharing	
instruments	in	the	case	of	the	realisation	of	a	systemic	risk.	Moreover,	new	information	about	
the	 frequency	and	 severity	of	 floods	may	 lead	 to	a	 reassessment	of	 the	 individual	 flood	 risk.	
However,	 this	 result	 can	 also	 be	 explained	 by	 the	 role	 of	 heuristics,	 resulting	 in	 the	
underestimation	of	future	events	after	the	experience	of	a	severe	shock	(Galarza	&	Carter	2011;	
De	Bock	&	Gelade	2012).		
Individuals	who	have	received	support	from	the	government	following	a	previous	disaster	have	
a	 significantly	 lower	 demand	 for	 microinsurance.	 Therefore,	 the	 presented	 discrete	 choice	
experiment	shows	evidence	of	charity	hazard	–	the	crowding	out	of	market-based	insurance	by	
external	assistance	(Raschky	et	al.	2012;	Raschky	&	Schwindt	2011;	Kousky	et	al.	2013).	Similar	
results	can	found	in	other	recent	studies	in	developing	countries	(Turner	et	al.	2014;	Liu	et	al.	
2015;	Grislain-Letrémy	2015).	
Finally,	this	study	shows	that	individuals	owning	more	agricultural	land	have	on	average	a	higher	
preference	for	the	status	quo,	a	result	which	align	with	observations	by	Arshad	et	al.	(2015)	in	
Pakistan.	Similarly,	 individuals	using	chemical	 fertiliser	–	a	proxy	 for	more	developed	 farmers	
–	are	less	likely	to	buy	microinsurance.	However,	this	may	be	a	result	of	developing	adaptation	
strategies	and	therefore	a	higher	level	of	resilience	–	ranging	from	physical	coping	mechanisms	
to	psychological	strategies	–	which	reduce	the	perception	of	damages	and	therefore	decrease	
the	value	of	flood	insurance	(Turner	et	al.	2014).	
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6 Conclusion	
The	higher	vulnerability	of	populations	in	developing	contexts	and	the	increasing	frequency	and	
intensity	 of	 natural	 hazards	 are	 likely	 to	 increase	 the	 already	 significant	 economic	 and	
humanitarian	effects	of	natural	disasters.	Microinsurance	products	continue	to	gain	the	interest	
of	both	academics	and	practitioners.	Although	seen	as	a	promising	instrument,	the	demand	for	
these	projects	remains	low.	
This	 paper	 investigated	 the	 impact	 of	 various	 determinants	 on	 the	 hypothetical	 demand	 for	
microinsurance	 in	 rural	 Cambodia.	 A	 discrete	 choice	 experiment	 is	 used	 in	 order	 to	 elicit	
individual	preferences	for	various	product	attributes	and	to	analyse	the	role	of	determinants,	
including	individual	risk-taking	propensity,	levels	of	trust	and	exposure	to	flood	risks.	
Overall,	 the	 study	 shows	a	preference	 for	 change	and	 therefore	an	 interest	 in	 the	presented	
microinsurance	 products,	 with	 a	 particular	 demand	 for	 insurance	 from	 more	 vulnerable	
individuals.	As	expected,	the	price	of	the	product	was	found	to	have	a	negative	effect	on	the	
demand	for	microinsurance,	although	the	effect	decreased	with	higher	incomes.	Furthermore,	a	
preference	 for	a	bundle	of	 insurance	with	credit	was	 found,	emphasising	 the	complementary	
nature	of	the	relationship	of	both	products.	Non-governmental	organisations	are	preferred	as	
providers	 over	 the	 national	 government	 and	 insurance	 products	 with	 additional	 prevention	
requirements	were	less	in	demand.		
Greater	 financial	 literacy	 and	 therefore	 a	 better	 understanding	 of	 the	 insurance	 product	
increases	the	demand	for	microinsurance.	A	negative	effect	of	risk	aversion	on	insurance	demand	
was	 found,	 a	 result	 that	 contrasts	with	 traditional	 insurance	 theory	 but	 aligns	with	 previous	
microinsurance	 research.	 One	 explanation	 for	 this	 observation	 may	 be	 the	 perception	 of	
insurance	instruments	as	risky	elements	in	themselves.	Surprisingly,	higher	individual	levels	of	
trust	 were	 found	 to	 have	 a	 significantly	 negative	 effect	 on	 the	 demand	 for	 microinsurance.	
Therefore	it	can	be	argued	that	interpersonal	trust	–	as	measured	by	the	investment	game	–	may	
be	a	proxy	for	individuals’	reliance	on	the	stability	and	efficiency	of	informal,	community-based	
risk-sharing	 instruments,	 which	 operate	 as	 substitutes	 to	 insurance	 products.	 Moreover,	
individuals	with	previous	experience	of	natural	disasters	are	less	likely	to	buy	the	microinsurance	
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products,	although	this	effect	decreases	with	higher	expectations	of	severe	consequences	in	the	
future.	 Finally,	 this	 paper	 shows	empirical	 evidence	 for	 charity	 hazard	 –	 the	 crowding	out	 of	
market-based	insurance	products	by	the	provision	of	external	assistance	from	the	government	
or	non-governmental	organisations.	
These	 results	 contribute	 significant	 household	 level	 evidence	 to	 the	 current	 research	
investigating	the	determinants	of	microinsurance	demand,	using	a	unique	data	set	following	a	
discrete	 choice	 experiment,	 an	 extensive	 survey	 and	 two	 behavioural	 experiments	 in	 rural	
Cambodia.	However,	microinsurance	is	only	one	possible	risk	management	instrument	amongst	
others,	and	its	efficiency	relies	on	a	broader	risk	management	scheme.	Moreover,	this	research	
concentrates	solely	on	demand-side	effects,	although	supply-side	effects	should	be	investigated	
in	context	and	in	detail,	in	order	to	create	a	sustainable	insurance	product.	
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